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INTRODUCTION 
I haven’t time to tell you what emotions we experience in 
traversing this half-wild, half-civilized country, in which fifty 
years ago were to be found numerous and powerful nations 
who have disappeared from the earth, or who have been 
pushed back into still more distant forests; a country where 
are to be seen, rising with prodigious rapidity, new peoples 
and brilliant cities which pitilessly take the place of the un-
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happy Indians too feeble to resist them. Half a century ago 
the name of the Iroquois, of the Mohawks, their tribes, their 
power filled these regions, and now hardly the memory of 
them remains. Their majestic forests are falling everyday; civ-
ilized nations are established on the ruins . . . .1 
A vast and significant body of scholarship, dating back at 
least to Adam Smith, has long held secure private property 
rights to be a fundamental prerequisite for trade, labor special-
ization, efficient investments, credit access, liberty, govern-
ment accountability, growth-promoting economic policies, func-
tioning markets, and a myriad of other engines of economic de-
velopment.2 Yet, historically, economic development has often 
involved the expropriation of land and resources from groups 
that are marginalized culturally, racially, ethnically, or socio-
                                                                                                                                     
 1. Letter from Gustave de Beaumont to his brother (July 6, 1831), in 
GEORGE WILSON PIERSON, TOCQUEVILLE IN AMERICA 191 (Oxford Univ. Press 
1938) (1830). 
 2. See generally FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1976); 
KARL MARX, 1 CAPITAL (Eden Paul & Cedar Paul trans., 4th German ed. 1978) 
(1867) [hereinafter MARX, CAPITAL]; DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990) [hereinafter 
INSTITUTIONS]; JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF 
INEQUALITY AMONG MEN (Franklin Philip trans., 1994) (1754); ADAM SMITH, 
AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776); 
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985); 
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Harold 
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967); 
Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: 
Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century 
England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803 (1989); Timothy Besley, Property Rights and 
Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana, 103 J. POL. ECON. 
903 (1995); Lee J. Alston, Gary D. Libecap & Robert Schneider, The Determi-
nants and Impact of Property Rights: Land Titles on the Brazilian Frontier, 
12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 25 (1996); Richard A. Posner, Creating a Legal Frame-
work for Economic Development, 13 THE WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 1 
(1998); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM 
TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000); Daron Acemoglu, 
Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, The Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development: An Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369 (2001) 
[hereinafter Colonial Origins]; Erica Field, Property Rights and Investment in 
Urban Slums, 3 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 279 (2005); Markus Goldstein & Christo-
pher Udry, The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in 
Ghana, 116 J. POL. ECON. 981 (2008); Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 
Property Rights and Economic Development (London Sch. Econ., STICERD 
Research, Working Paper No. EOPP 006, 2009), available at 
http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/eopp/eopp06.pdf. 
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economically, and the reallocation of these resources into the 
hands of more politically powerful constituencies with access to 
the knowledge and capital necessary for efficient investment.3 
Reconciling this apparent contradiction requires recognizing 
that whose property rights are secure matters fundamentally 
for the political and economic implications of secure property 
rights. 
Protecting the property rights entitlements of some inherent-
ly requires preventing others from claiming and controlling 
those same resources.4 “Before ‘property rights’ can be strong or 
weak, they must be allocated and defined”5—and the allocation 
and enforcement of resource entitlements through legal institu-
tions reflects the distribution of political power.6 But recent 
cross-country and comparative research regarding property 
                                                                                                                                     
 3. See generally World Comm’n on Dams, People and Large Dam—Social 
Performance, DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION 
MAKING (2000), http://www.dams.org//docs/report/wcdch4.pdf; JAMES A. 
YELLING, COMMON FIELD AND ENCLOSURE IN ENGLAND 1450–1850 (1977); see 
also PIERSON, supra note 1, 189–96; The Damned: Five Controversial Dams: 
Brazil, PBS (Sept. 18, 2003), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/episodes/the-
damned/five-controversial-dams/brazil/3107 [hereinafter PBS]. 
 4. See Guido Calabresi & Douglas A. Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 
1090 (1972); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 743, 747 (1917). 
 5. David W. Kennedy, Some Caution About Property Rights as a Recipe 
for Economic Development 8 (Harv. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, 
Working Paper No. 09–59, 2010), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/dkennedy/publications/PropertyRightsDe
velopmentOct17Draft.pdf. 
 6. See JEAN ENSMINGER, MAKING A MARKET: THE INSTITUTIONAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF AN AFRICAN SOCIETY 126–28, 142, 148 (1992); GARY D. 
LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 16–17, 24–27(1989); ITAI SENED, 
THE POLITICAL INSTITUTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY 50, 149– 54 (1997); KATHRYN 
FIRMIN-SELLERS, THE TRANSFORMATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GOLD 
COAST: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS APPLYING RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 154 
(1996); Lee J. Alston, Edwyna Harris & Bernardo Mueller, De Facto and de 
Jure Property Rights: Land Settlement and Land Conflict on the Australian, 
Brazilian and U.S. Frontiers 2, 11–14 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Work-
ing Paper No. 15264, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15264; 
Lee J. Alston et al., Toward an Understanding of Property Rights, in 
EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 31–33 (Lee J. Alston et al. eds., 
1996); Sumner J. La Croix & James Roumasset, The Evolution of Private 
Property in Nineteenth-Century Hawaii, 50 J. ECON. HIST. 829, 845–47 (1999); 
Katrina M. Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of Private 
Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117, 129, 141 (2005). 
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rights and economic development employs a black-box concep-
tion of property rights that effaces the heterogeneity in proper-
ty rights enjoyment within countries.7 In other words, in this 
research, property rights are considered as a one-dimensional 
concept, in which rights are assumed to apply uniformly (ho-
mogeneously) to all people and entities that are subject to those 
laws. No recognition is given to the possibility that different 
constituencies may experience the application of the rule of law 
differently. Yet as legal scholars have long recognized, law is 
not divorced from politics and power, nor is it completely im-
partial and objective in its application.8 A one-dimensional con-
ception of property rights or “institutional quality”9 more 
broadly ignores significant variation in the risk of expropria-
tion faced by different ethnic, cultural, and religious groups in 
the same country. 
                                                                                                                                     
 7. See Colonial Origins, supra note 2, at 1369–70; Daron Acemoglu, Si-
mon Johnson & James A. Robinson, Reversal of Fortune: Geography and In-
stitutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution, 117 Q.J. 
ECON. 1231, 1262–63 (2002) [hereinafter Geography and Institutions]; Daron 
Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, Unbundling Institutions, 113 J. POL. ECON. 949, 
957 (2005) [hereinafter Unbundling Institutions]; Valerie Bockstette, 
Areendum Chanda & Louis Putterman, States and Markets: The Advantage 
of an Early Start, 7 J. ECON. GROWTH 347, 352 (2002); Christopher Clague et. 
al., Contract-Intensive Money: Contract Enforcement, Property Rights, and 
Economic Performance, 4 J. ECON. GROWTH 185, 188 (1999); Robert E. Hall & 
Charles I. Jones, Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per 
Worker than Others?, 114 Q.J. ECON. 83, 84–85 (1999); Daniel Kaufmann, 
Aart Kraay & Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, Governance Matters 1–6 (World Bank 
Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 2196, 1999) [hereinafter Governance Matters]; 
Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Institutions and Economic Performance: 
Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures, 7 ECON. POL. 
207, 208 (1995); Danni Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian & Francesco Trebbi, 
Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integra-
tion in Economic Development, 9 J. ECON. GROWTH 131, 135 (2004). 
 8. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881); see also WILLIAM 
W. FISHER, III, MORTON J. HORWITZ, & THOMAS REED, AMERICAN LEGAL 
REALISM (1993). 
 9. “Institutions” is a term of art broadly used in the economics, political 
science, and political economy literature to refer to “the rules of the game” 
that structure and constrain “human interaction.” See INSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 2, at 3. “Institutional quality” is a broad term used to indicate how 
“good” or “bad” these institutions are. See generally Kevin E. Davis, Institu-
tions and Economic Development: A Introduction to the Literature (NYU Sch. 
Law Working Papers, Paper No. 202, 2009), available at 
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1206&context=nyu_lewp. 
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Using a new set of indicators that measures the property in-
security of ethnocultural minorities, this Article demonstrates 
empirically that severe property insecurity for some groups of-
ten exists alongside very secure property rights for others. Het-
erogeneity in property rights enjoyment means that property 
rights can simultaneously be strong and secure for some groups 
and weak and insecure for other groups. In many countries, 
members of marginalized groups face significantly higher prop-
erty insecurity than the majority, foreign investors, or domestic 
elites. The cross-national indices of institutional quality widely 
used in the research literature—initially designed to assess the 
property security of foreign investors—fail to adequately ac-
count for the legal institutions encountered by marginalized 
minority groups. 
Moreover, this Article demonstrates empirically that the 
property rights security or insecurity experienced by marginal-
ized groups is not related to long-run economic development. 
Economic growth can still occur when the property rights of the 
majority are secure but marginalized minorities face a high 
risk of expropriation. In such instances, land is reallocated into 
the hands of investors with better access to know-how, capital, 
and other complementary production inputs. At the same time, 
secure property rights for marginalized minorities are not re-
quired for the government accountability that facilitates aggre-
gate growth-enhancing economic policies: security of property 
rights for elites can increase accountability of the governing 
elites towards other elites with divergent interests, while broad 
but not universal property rights security can generate ac-
countability of public officials to the majority while still exclud-
ing the minority. Both mechanisms can incentivize the adop-
tion of broadly growth-enhancing economic policies that benefit 
the majority but harm some other groups. 
These findings have serious implications, opening up ques-
tions regarding potential trade-offs between property rights 
security for marginalized groups, property rights security for 
more politically powerful constituencies, socioeconomic inclu-
sion, and economic growth. On the one hand, if aggregate eco-
nomic growth is the objective, then policymakers may wish to 
ignore (or encourage) the expropriation of land and resources 
from marginalized groups, and the reallocation of these re-
sources into the hands of more productive investors or political 
constituencies who will advocate for growth enhancing policies. 
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On the other hand, if broadly inclusive economic development 
that reduces poverty and socioeconomic exclusion in the short-
term is the central goal, then attention must be paid ex ante to 
distributional issues in terms of both outcomes and processes. 
This is a real and pressing issue today on almost every conti-
nent, and in countries as diverse as China, Indonesia, Brazil, 
Ecuador, Kenya, and Nigeria. Emerging economies, in particu-
lar, may seek to encourage capital inflows by improving the in-
vestment climate for foreign direct investment, and to develop 
hydropower, oil, arable land, and other natural resources often 
located in rural regions to power new industry and feed a grow-
ing urban population. The challenge from a policy perspective 
arises if there are trade-offs between property rights security 
for marginalized groups and aggregate economic growth. Eth-
nocultural groups with the least power and voice may be left 
out by growth-enhancing policies that strengthen the property 
rights of those with access to capital and political influence by 
weakening the property rights of marginalized groups. This 
suggests that a narrow focus on aggregate economic growth—
without specific attention also to political and economic inclu-
sion and the equitable application of the law—may hurt the 
most vulnerable. 
I. LAW, POWER, AND HETEROGENEITY IN RIGHTS ENJOYMENT 
A. The Scope, Allocation, and Enforcement of Property Rights 
Some may disagree, but in reality, law is not impartial. In 
fact, it reflects the distribution and operation of political power. 
Yet recent legal and economics research on the relationship be-
tween property rights and economic development implicitly as-
sumes that the laws of a country are applied uniformly to all 
without distinction.10 In the cross-national literature in partic-
ular, if a state is considered to have a high level of property 
rights security and strong protections for property rights, eve-
ryone’s rights are taken as equally secure and the country is 
categorized as having “good institutions”.11 Likewise, if a state 
is considered to have a low level of property rights security and 
weak protection for property rights, everyone’s property rights 
are viewed as equally insecure and the country is classified as 
                                                                                                                                     
 10. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; infra Section II.B. 
 11. Id. 
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having “bad institutions.”12 However, heterogeneity in the rule 
of law and disparities in property rights enjoyment between 
different groups within the same country have been largely ig-
nored. 
Work within institutional economics certainly recognizes that 
the “rules of the game” depend on relations of power.13 In the 
dialogic between institutional rules and organizational actors, 
individuals and organizations operate to maximize their own 
interests within a given set of incentives determined by the ex-
isting institutional constraints, but then also work to change 
these rules to their own benefit. This is the theoretical heart of 
the vast body of research that foregrounds the role played by 
institutions in long-run economic development.14 
However, insufficient attention has been paid to the fact that 
not only the form of institutions, but also the scope and appli-
cation of the rules depend on politics and the distribution of 
power. A one-dimensional lens is particularly apt to distort re-
ality in the case of the right to property, which is a zero-sum 
game. Protecting the resource claims of some parties requires 
preventing others from using those same resources; therefore, 
property rights must be defined and allocated before their pro-
tection can be strong or weak.15 Given the zero-sum nature of 
                                                                                                                                     
 12. Id. 
 13. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BATES, MARKETS AND STATES IN TROPICAL AFRICA: 
THE POLITICAL BASIS OF AGRICULTURAL POLICIES 2–3 (1981); North & 
Weingast, supra note 2, at 803; INSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 3–10, 107–118; 
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 2–4 
(2005); Stanley L. Engerman & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Factor Endowments, 
Institutions, and Differential Paths of Growth Among New World Economies: 
A View from Economic Historians of the United States, in HOW LATIN 
AMERICA FELL BEHIND 260 (Stephan Haber ed., 1997) [hereinafter Institu-
tions]; Stanley L. Engerman & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Factor Endowments, Ine-
quality, and Paths of Development among New World Economies, 3 ECONOMIA 
41, 44, 57, 60, 64, 82–83 (2002) [hereinafter Inequality]; Daniel Kaufmann, 
Aart Kraay & Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, Governance Matters II: Updated Indica-
tors for 2000-2001 (World Bank Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 2772, 2002); 
DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP 
AND DEMOCRACY (2006); Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Persistence of 
Power, Elites and Institutions, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 267, 268, 287 (2008). 
 14. See, e.g., KEVIN DAVIS, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
(2010); Justin Yifu Lin & Jeffrey B. Nugent, Institutions and Economic De-
velopment, in HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS (J. Behrman & T.N. 
Srinivasan eds., 1995). 
 15. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 8. 
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property rights, alongside the role of political power in deter-
mining de facto institutional environments, the allocation and 
enforcement of resource entitlements is particularly prone to 
heterogeneous treatment of groups and claimants. 
A property right is relational—it gives the possessor superior 
claims to a specific resource against the rest of the world, or 
some subset thereof.16 The possessor of a property right asserts 
and exercises her rights in relation to other potential claim-
ants; she can simultaneously have superior rights against 
some, but inferior rights against others. For example, imagine 
a home owner who takes out three mortgages, using his home 
as collateral. If he defaults on all three loans, the holder of the 
first priority mortgage lien has the right to the value of the 
property up until the amount of the lien is satisfied, then the 
holder of the second priority lien—who has an inferior right 
compared to that of the first lender, but a superior claim to 
that of the third lender—has a right to the value of the proper-
ty used as collateral until the debt is cleared, and so on.17 The 
common law rule of “finders keepers” likewise exemplifies the 
relational nature of property rights—the “finder” has superior 
rights to a found object against everyone except the original 
owner who lost the item.18 Clearly, therefore, the allocation and 
protection of a secure resource entitlement for one party inher-
ently requires denying an alternative claimant the ability to 
control the use of that resource. 
Classical political economists recognized the relational na-
ture of property rights and the role played by political power in 
defining, allocating, and enforcing claims to resource entitle-
ments. Although Jean-Jacques Rousseau lauded secure private 
property rights as a prerequisite for market exchange and a 
functioning modern economy,19 he also argued that the en-
shrinement of property rights in a social contract was, in es-
sence, a grand theft perpetrated by the rich, clever, and strong 
                                                                                                                                     
 16. See Hohfeld, supra note 4, at 743–45, 747; Calabresi & Melamed, supra 
note 4, at 1089–93. 
 17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.1 cmt. a (1997). 
 18. See Armory v. Delamirie, (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B); J.G. 
SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW §§ 4.04–.05 (2d ed. 2007). 
 19. Yoav Peled, Rousseau’s Inhibited Radicalism: An Analysis of His Polit-
ical Thought in Light of His Economic Ideas, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1034, 
1036–37, 1043 (1980). 
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on the less well-off.20 Having obtained de facto control over land 
and resources, Rousseau contended that the de jure protection 
of these property rights claims protected and perpetuated the 
tenuous and previously contested position of elites.21 Addition-
ally, Karl Marx argued that the private property relations that 
form the legal superstructure of capitalism entrench the al-
ready powerful:22 in this view, private property enables capital 
accumulation, leading to ever increasing inequality and putting 
the owners of the means of production in an advantaged bar-
gaining position vis-à-vis wage laborers, which allows the own-
ers of capital to capture all surplus value. 
Moreover, the role of political power in determining the 
scope, allocation, and enforcement of property rights is readily 
apparent both historically and in the modern administrative 
state.23 The multiplicity of potential property rights that may 
or may not be recognized and protected by de jure and de facto 
legal institutions also contributes to heterogeneity in the en-
joyment of secure property rights. Property rights are widely 
understood by legal scholars as a “bundle of sticks”, with each 
stick in the bundle representing a right or a privilege.24 For ex-
ample, the English case of Sturges v. Bridgman—upon which 
Ronald Coase based his famous The Problem of Social Cost25—
addressed whether a physician had the right to stop his next-
door neighbor, a confectioner, from operating his mortars to 
grind sugar.26 The question is whether, in the bundle of sticks 
that constituted property ownership, the doctor had the right to 
enjoy silence so that he could see his patients undisturbed, or 
whether the confectioner had the right to produce sugar in his 
factory. Coase argued that inefficiency results when neither 
right is clearly defined, thereby preventing bargaining;27 here 
                                                                                                                                     
 20. ROUSSEAU, supra note 2, at 55–67. 
 21. Id. at 55–84. 
 22. See MARX, CAPITAL, supra note 2, at 831–58; Karl Marx, Economic & 
Philosophic Manuscripts, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER (R. Tucker ed., 1978) 
(1844). 
 23. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 24. Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss, Introduction to PROPERTY 
STORIES 1 (Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2d ed. 2009); Kenne-
dy, supra note 5, at 26. 
 25. Coase, supra note 2, at 8–10. 
 26. Sturges v. Bridgman [1879] 11 Ch.D. 852 (Eng.). 
 27. See generally Coase, supra note 2. 
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the first-order problem is clearly not in making the property 
right secure, but in defining and allocating it in the first place. 
The wide diversity of rights that may be enjoyed as part of a 
bundle of property rights is evident in many low and middle 
income countries. Throughout Africa, for example, “one user 
might have the right to sow and harvest, another to collect fruit 
from trees on the land, and a third to bring in livestock to feed 
on crop residues after the harvest.”28 In southeast Nigeria and 
southern Mali, the village leaders allocate farming land to fam-
ily heads based on need but retain reversionary rights to the 
land as trustees on behalf of the group, while individuals have 
enduring rights to any physical structures they build and to 
any trees they plant. This means that one family could have 
temporary use rights to the soil while the son of the person who 
planted nut trees on the land the generation prior has the right 
to gather the nuts.29 In the north-central flood plains of the Ni-
ger Delta, where herding, farming, and fishing coexist and are 
practiced by different ethnic groups, herders have the right to 
use given land for pasture during the off-season, while farmers 
use this same land to grow crops during a different part of the 
year.30 When some kinds of rights—some of the “sticks in the 
bundle”—are protected by property rights institutions, but oth-
ers are not, the groups whose members enjoy the protected 
kinds of rights benefit, while those with unprotected rights lose 
out. 
If private freehold titles are protected, but various usufruct 
rights such as hunting, fishing, grazing cattle, and gathering 
berries are not, then the parties best positioned to claim pri-
vate freehold ownership benefit while others lose access to for-
merly shared resources. Because property rights can be under-
stood as a bundle of sticks, when different groups lay claim to 
                                                                                                                                     
 28. Tor A. Benjaminsen, Formalising Land Tenure in Rural Africa, 2 
NORWEGIAN INST. OF INT’L AFF. 362 (2002); JOHN W. BRUCE, COUNTRY 
PROFILES OF LAND TENURE: AFRICA 266–70 (1996); Rohini Pande & Christo-
pher Udry, Institutions and Development: A View From Below, in ADVANCES 
IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 345, 377 (Rich-
ard Blundell et al. eds., 2006). 
 29. See Benjaminsen, supra note 40, at 362; Karol C. Boudreaux, The Hu-
man Face of Resource Conflict: Property and Power in Nigeria, 7 SAN DIEGO 
INT’L L.J. 61, 71–76 (2005). 
 30. See generally id. See also Peter A. Dewees, Trees and Farm Bounda-
ries: Farm Forestry, Land Tenure and Reform in Kenya, Africa, 65 AFR: J. 
INT’L AFR. INST. 217, 220–21 (1995). 
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different kinds of sticks, the recognition and protection of some 
rights, but not others, in the bundle creates heterogeneity in 
property rights security. Therefore, the scope of application of 
property rights protection can engender heterogeneity in the 
security of property rights enjoyment. 
Due to the relational, zero-sum nature of property rights, as 
well as the complexity and multidimensionality of the bundle of 
rights that constitute property interests, we should expect that 
the role played by political power in determining the institu-
tional rules of the game will often lead to heterogeneity be-
tween groups within countries in the enjoyment of property 
rights security—yet this is not the baseline assumption of 
much of the “institutions and economic development” research 
literature.31 
B. Measuring Property Rights Security: One-Dimensional Indi-
ces in the Research Literature 
Cross-country comparative research—which aims to explain 
aggregate growth or other development outcomes with refer-
ence to institutional conditions for an entire country-unit—is 
particularly susceptible to the eliding of property rights’ inher-
ent complexity. Recent “institutions and development” research 
has often unwittingly adopted a legal positivist approach, in 
which law is seen as inherently impartial in its application.32 
Heterogeneity in the scope and application of de facto institu-
tions is effaced by this simplistic, legal positivist framework. 33 
This section examines the cross-country indices of institu-
tional quality most widely used in the research literature, re-
vealing that due to vantage point bias and methodology of con-
struction, scores on these indices fail to adequately reflect the 
legal institutions encountered by marginalized minority 
groups. The focus is on indicators which have been widely in-
fluential: the International Country Risk Guide (“ICRG”), the 
Heritage Foundation’s property rights index, and the World 
                                                                                                                                     
 31. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also infra Section II.B. 
 32. HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 1 (2007). 
 33. In contrast, legal realists have long sought to penetrate beyond stated 
rules and norms to understand how the law operates in action, highlighting 
the difference between the “law on the books” and “law in action”. See, e.g., 
Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean 
Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, 
The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2008). 
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Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. The ICRG, a compo-
nent of Political Risk Services (“PRS”), was first created in 
1980 by the editors of a weekly newsletter on international fi-
nance and economics called International Reports.34 The ICRG 
risk ratings system has twenty-two components grouped into 
three major categories of risk: political, financial, and econom-
ic. Each component is assigned a numerical value, with the 
highest number of points indicating the lowest risk. ICRG 
scores are based on a subjective assessment by experts em-
ployed by PRS. The property rights index evaluates the risk of 
“outright confiscation and forced nationalization of property;” 
lower ratings are assigned to “countries where expropriation of 
private foreign investment is a likely event.”35 
The initial purpose of the ICRG was to “meet the needs of cli-
ents for an in-depth and exhaustively researched analysis of 
the potential risks to international business operations.”36 Ac-
cording to PRS, the primary users and consumers of the ICRG 
ratings data are “institutional investors, banks, multinational 
corporations, importers, exporters, and foreign exchange trad-
ers,” who use the ICRG model to “determine how financial, 
economic, and political risk might affect their business and in-
vestments now and in the future.”37 
Given that the intended customers of the ICRG are investors, 
multinational corporations, importers, and exporters, it is only 
logical that the ranking system would be targeted to reflect the 
investment risks posed to these kinds of customers. In other 
words, the information on expropriation risk, by its very de-
sign, is meant to reflect the risk posed to the enterprises of the 
large and often multinational businesses that are purchasing 
the ICRG data, not the average citizen of a country—and even 
less the property rights of marginalized ethnocultural minority 
groups, who are clearly not purchasing the ICRG data. This 
intentional evaluation of risk from the standpoint of foreign 
investors and domestic elites is reinforced by the source of the 
data—expert evaluations—as financial and business experts 
                                                                                                                                     
 34. International Country Risk Guide Methodology, POLITICAL RISK SERV. 
GRP., http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx (last visited Nov. 9, 
2012). 
 35. IRIS-3 File of International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Data, IRIS 
CTR., http://weber.ucsd.edu/~tkousser/IRIS_doc.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2012). 
 36. International Country Risk Guide Methodology, supra note 51. 
 37. Id. 
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are likely to be more familiar with threats posed to interna-
tional capital than to poor local resource users.38 
This property rights index from ICRG has been widely used 
in cross-country research as a proxy for “institutional quality” 
in a general sense, and for the security of property rights more 
specifically. For example, in their well-known and widely-cited 
article examining the relationship between institutions and 
long-run growth, Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer used a re-
scaled version of the ICRG index score to measure “institution-
al quality.”39 The frequently cited work of Daron Acemoglu, 
Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, in which settler mor-
tality is used as an instrumental variable for institutions, also 
relies upon the ICRG risk of expropriation index as a proxy for 
institutional quality.40 The ICRG index is pervasive as well in 
the cross-country research on the relationship among natural 
resource abundance, institutions, growth, and conflict.41 
A number of other indices also attempt to quantitatively 
measure property rights across countries. Most prominently, 
the Heritage Foundation scores “the degree to which a coun-
try’s laws protect private property rights and the degree to 
which its government enforces those laws.”42 The Heritage 
Foundation’s property rights indicator is expansive, address-
ing: “the likelihood that private property will be expropriated[,] 
. . . the independence of the judiciary, the existence of corrup-
tion within the judiciary, and the ability of individuals and 
businesses to enforce contracts.”43 Like the ICRG index, the 
less certain the legal protection of property, the lower a coun-
try’s score. For example, a country receives 100% if “private 
property is guaranteed by the government[,] [t]he court system 
                                                                                                                                     
 38. Kevin E. Davis, What Can the Rule of Law Variable Tell Us About Rule 
of Law Reforms?, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 141, 148–49, 150–51 (2004). 
 39. Knack & Keefer, supra note 7, at 210, 212. 
 40. See Colonial Origins, supra note 2, at 1370–71; Geography and Institu-
tions, supra note 7, at 1266; see also infra Part I.C. 
 41. See Anne D. Boschini, Jan Pettersson & Jesper Roine, Resource Curse 
or Not: A Question of Appropriability, 109 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 593, 601, 
612 (2007); Simeon Djankov and Marta Reynal-Querol, Poverty and Civil 
Wars: Revisiting the Evidence, 92 REV. ECON. STAT. 1035, 1037–1041 (2010); 
Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, Institutions and the Resource 
Curse, 116 ECON. J. 1, 13–14 (2006). 
 42. HERITAGE FOUNDATION, 2012 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM 455 (2012), 
available at http://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/Index09_Methodology.pdf. 
 43. Id. 
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enforces contracts efficiently and quickly[, and] [t]he justice 
system punishes those who unlawfully confiscate private prop-
erty.”44 At the other extreme, a country receives a score of 0% 
when “private property is outlawed, and all property belongs to 
the state.”45 The index is a subjective score, based on infor-
mation gleaned from the following sources, in order of the fol-
lowing priority: Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Com-
merce; U.S. Department of Commerce, Country Commercial 
Guide; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices; and U.S. Department of State, Investment 
Climate Statements.46 Once again, all these sources except for 
the U.S. State Department Reports have as their primary au-
dience large commercial investors interested in assessing the 
investment risks posed to their business ventures. Moreover, 
countries receive high scores only for securely protecting pri-
vate property rights. Secure protection of the communal prop-
erty rights of ethnocultural minorities is not considered by the 
index. This is a significant shortcoming, given that throughout 
Africa, Latin America, Asia, North America, and Europe, over 
300 million members of indigenous groups hold land commu-
nally in accordance with customary law.47 
The World Bank’s widely used Worldwide Governance Indi-
cators (“WGI”), initially developed by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart 
Kraay, and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton,48 incorporate the Heritage 
Foundation’s property security measure as well as the property 
rights measure from ICRG. The WGI consists of aggregate in-
dices corresponding to six basic governance concepts: (1) Voice 
& Accountability; (2) Political Instability & Violence; (3) Gov-
ernment Effectiveness; (4) Regulatory Burden; (5) Rule of Law; 
and (6) Graft. These aggregate indices are based on governance 
indicators taken from thirty-five data sources—including both 
                                                                                                                                     
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME [UNDP], INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE–PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 1, 3–5 (2004) (by Rodolfo Stavenhagen), 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2004/papers/HDR2004_Rodolfo_Stav
enhagen.pdf; Secretariat of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 
Dep’t of Econ. and Soc. Affairs, State of the World’s Indigenous Peoples, at 1, 
51–57, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/328 (Dec. 2009). 
 48. Governance Matters, supra note 7, at 21. 
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the ICRG and the Heritage Foundation Index.49 It would be dif-
ficult to overstate the reach and influence of the WGI as a re-
search tool in cross-country analysis. The most recent Govern-
ance Matters publication50 ranks as one of the top fifty down-
loads on the Social Science Research Network (“SSRN”).51 
C. A New Index: Measuring the Property Insecurity of Margin-
alized Groups 
This Article presents an alternative Property Insecurity In-
dex, specifically designed to evaluate the security of property 
rights enjoyed or not enjoyed by marginalized groups, rather 
than foreign investors and domestic elites. The Property Inse-
curity Index is a composite measure of the property insecurity 
experienced by each minority group in every country included 
in the Minorities at Risk (“MAR”) database.52 The MAR data-
base assesses the political and economic exclusion of ethnocul-
tural minorities in every country with a population of at least 
500,000.53 Experts assign a numerical score indicating the se-
verity of exclusion to each group along an array of political, 
economic, social, and cultural dimensions. A “minority at risk” 
is defined as “an ethnopolitical group (non-state communal 
group) that collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic 
discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a society; 
and/or collectively mobilizes in defense or promotion of its self-
defined interests.”54 The following four variables identify the 
factors present in the group which make it a minority at risk: 
(1) the group is subject to discrimination at present; (2) the 
group is disadvantaged due to past discrimination; (3) the 
group is an advantaged minority; and (4) the group supports 
                                                                                                                                     
 49. Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Mat-
ters VIII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996–2008 7, 29 
(World Bank Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 4978, 2009). 
 50. Id. 
 51. SSRN Top 10,000 Papers, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK, 
http://hq.ssrn.com/rankings/Ranking_display.cfm?TRN_gID=10&requesttime
out=900 (last visited Nov. 9, 2012). 
 52. The MAR database was developed and is maintained by the University 
of Maryland’s Center for International Development and Conflict Manage-
ment. CTR. FOR INT’L DEV. AND CONFLICT MGMT., MINORITIES AT RISK (MAR) 
CODEBOOK VERSION 2/2009 at 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data/mar_codebook_Feb09.pdf. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
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political organizations advocating greater group rights. Groups 
are included in the MAR database if the group has a population 
larger than 100,000 or greater than 1% of a country’s popula-
tion.55 
The property insecurity score for the Property Insecurity In-
dex for each group is based on MAR scores in three dimensions: 
dispossession from land, forced internal resettlement, and in-
ternal resettlement by policy. Like the ICRG and Heritage 
Foundation indices, the Property Insecurity Index measures the 
de facto, rather than de jure, protection from expropriation ex-
perienced by ethnocultural minority groups. The index detects 
state failure to protect the property rights of minority groups 
from incursions by other (possibly more powerful and influen-
tial) private actors, as well as direct state acts of expropriation. 
Country Property Insecurity scores are generated by aggregat-
ing the property insecurity scores of all minority groups within 
each country. 
There are three versions of the Property Insecurity Index. The 
first, Property Insecurity (Weighted), is a sum of group property 
insecurities weighted by the group’s proportional representa-
tion within a country’s population. The second, Property Inse-
curity (Max), reflects the property insecurity of the worst-off 
group in a country. The third, Property Insecurity (Mean) re-
flects the average property insecurity score of minority groups 
within a country. All three versions are compared to the ICRG 
and Heritage Foundation Indices in Part I.D below. Property 
Insecurity (Max) is then used in Part II to examine the relation 
between property insecurity for marginalized groups and long-
run economic development, because Property Insecurity (Max) 
best captures the most severe property insecurity faced by any 
group in a country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
 55. Id. at 1-2. 
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Property Insecurity for Group G = Pg = (evictiong + 
forced_resettleg + resettle_policyg)/3 
Property Insecurity for Country I (Weighted) = Σ(gprog)Pg 
Property Insecurity for Country I (Max) = Pworst 
Property Insecurity for Country I (Mean) = Average(Pg) 
Where gprog = group’s proportion of the population, evictiong 
= dispossession from land, forced_resettleg = forced internal re-
settlement, and resettle_policyg = internal resettlement by poli-
cy. 
This Property Insecurity Index departs fundamentally from 
other measures of property rights security and institutional 
quality in two ways. First, it relies on data sources that assess 
the experience of the worst-off populations in a country—
precisely those groups that are supposedly the intended targets 
of economic development initiatives. Second, it explicitly aims 
to capture and aggregate the experience of many groups within 
a single country, rather than attempting to present an overall 
country measure of the average level of institutional quality 
supposedly experienced by everyone. In this sense, the concep-
tual starting point of the Property Insecurity measure is that a 
single indicator of property rights (or “institutional quality” 
more broadly) may potentially efface heterogeneity in rights 
enjoyment; an index that measures only averages, or the situa-
tion of elites, or both, inherently cannot detect variations in the 
experiences of different groups. 
D. Empirical Evidence of Heterogeneity in Property Rights Se-
curity 
The basic question of whether or not aggregate cross-country 
indices of property rights security reflect the property rights 
enjoyed by marginalized minorities can be answered empirical-
ly by examining the degree to which widely used measures of 
property rights institutions correlate with the level of property 
insecurity faced by ethnocultural minority groups. If property 
rights are homogeneous within countries, as implicitly as-
sumed in much of the cross-country institutions and economic 
development research, then all measures of property rights se-
curity would be highly correlated—with any correlation less 
than one reflecting only the measurement error generated by 
the assignation of scores through subjective evaluation. The 
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ICRG index and the Heritage Foundation index would there-
fore be highly and positively correlated with each other, and 
both would be inversely related to the Property Insecurity In-
dex. If instead property rights are indeed enjoyed heterogene-
ously by different groups within the same country, but the ag-
gregate property rights indices are still reflecting the rights 
enjoyed by ethnocultural minorities—as opposed to simply 
measuring the rights enjoyment of foreign investors and do-
mestic elites—then the ICRG and the Heritage Foundation 
Property Rights indices should be highly and inversely related 
to the Property Insecurity Index (Weighted), and weakly and 
inversely related to the Property Insecurity Index (Mean). 
The empirical evidence reveals both that (a) property rights 
enjoyment is indeed heterogeneous between groups within 
countries, and (b) existing widely used cross-country indices of 
property rights fail to adequately consider the property rights 
security enjoyed by marginalized minorities. Although the Her-
itage Foundation and the ICRG measures indeed correspond 
highly with each other, neither is related to our new indicators 
that measure the property insecurity experienced by marginal-
ized groups. Results are below in Tables 2 and 3, which show 
Kendall’s rank correlation coefficients for the different property 
rights measures. The data availability for the Heritage Foun-
dation and the ICRG measure differ, so Table 2 takes the years 
available for the ICRG Index as the baseline dataset, while Ta-
ble 3 takes the years available for the Heritage Foundation In-
dex as the baseline dataset. Descriptive statistics are displayed 
in Table 1. 
Kendall’s coefficient is the appropriate measure of correlation 
because the data is not normally distributed—the Heritage 
Foundation and ICRG measures are left-skewed, while the 
Property Insecurity Index has a large number of zero value ob-
servations and is therefore right-skewed. Unlike Pearson’s cor-
relation coefficient, the Kendall coefficient does not assume 
normality.56 And unlike Spearman’s coefficient, Kendall’s coef-
                                                                                                                                     
 56. Correlation measures the relationship between variables. The widely 
used Pearson product moment correlation reflects the degree of linear rela-
tionship between two variables, and is calculated assuming that the variables 
are continuous and normally distributed, there are few or no outliers, and 
any relationship is linear. The Spearman’s correlation is the nonparametric 
version of the Pearson correlation, and can be used when the assumptions 
required for the Pearson test are violated, such as for ordinal and rank-
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ficient is robust to “ties”, i.e., identical values for different ob-
servations, which are prevalent in this data set. 
The correlation between the two aggregate measures of prop-
erty rights security—the ICRG and Heritage Foundation Indi-
ces—is very high, regardless of the time period. Yet there is no 
statistical relationship whatsoever between the property inse-
curity of marginalized minorities and the ICRG or Heritage 
Foundation measures. The scatter plot graphs following the 
correlation tables further illustrate that the lack of any signifi-
cant correlation between standard property rights measures 
and the new Property Insecurity indices is not an artifact of 
some nonlinear relation; there simply is no relation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
ordered variables, and when the underlying data is not normally distributed 
or there is a monotonic but non-linear relationship between variables. The 
Kendall correlation coefficient is a different non-parametric test that 
measures rank correlations, which is robust to ties and penalizes lack of cor-
respondence by distance of dislocation rather than square of the distance. 
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Correlation 1
N 89
Correlation 0.526* 1
N 89 89
Correlation -0.023 -0.068 1
N 89 89 89
Correlation -0.143 -0.098 0.662* 1
N 89 89 89 89
Correlation -0.161* -0.087 0.680* 0.880* 1
N 89 89 89 89 89
Notes: ‘Property Insecurity Weighted’ is the sum of group property insecurity scores, weighted by their proportion 
of the population; ‘Property Insecurity Maximum’ is the property insecurity score of the worst off group; ‘Property 
Insecurity Mean’ is the unweighted average of group property insecurity scores. * represents significance at the 
5% level.  Phase IV release of the MAR dataset includes data from 1945-2003. 
Table 3. Correlations: 1995-2004
Heritage 
Foundation  
Property 
Rights,            
1995-2004
ICRG       
Property 
Rights,        
1985-1995
Property 
Insecurity 
Weighted,      
1995-2003
Property 
Insecurity 
Mean,          
1995-2003
Property 
Insecurity 
Max,           
1995-2003
Heritage 
Foundation  
Property Rights,     
1995-2004
ICRG Property 
Rights, 1985-1995
Property 
Insecurity 
Weighted, 1995-
2003
Property 
Insecurity Mean, 
1995-2003
Property 
Insecurity Max, 
1995-2003
Correlation 1
N 83
Correlation 0.517* 1
N 83 83
Correlation -0.142 -0.043 1
N 83 83 83
Correlation -0.108 -0.083 0.582* 1
N 83 83 83 83
Correlation -0.116 -0.132 0.566* 0.801* 1
N 83 83 83 83 83
Notes: ‘Property Insecurity Weighted’ is the sum of group property insecurity scores, weighted by their proportion 
of the population; ‘Property Insecurity Maximum’ is the property insecurity score of the worst off group; ‘Property 
Insecurity Mean’ is the unweighted average of group property insecurity scores.  * represents significance at the 
5% level.
Table 2. Correlations: 1985-1995
ICRG       
Property 
Rights,        
1985-1995
Heritage 
Foundation  
Property 
Rights,           
1995-2004
Property 
Insecurity 
Weighted,      
1985-1995
Property 
Insecurity 
Mean,          
1985-1995
Property 
Insecurity 
Max,           
1985-1995
ICRG Property 
Rights, 1985-1995
Heritage 
Foundation  
Property Rights,     
1995-2004
Property 
Insecurity 
Weighted, 1985-
1995
Property 
Insecurity Mean, 
1985-1995
Property 
Insecurity Max, 
1985-1995
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II. PROPERTY RIGHTS & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
A. Micro and Macro Theories: Why It Matters Whose Property 
Rights Are Secure 
There is an extraordinarily large and diverse body of research 
regarding the relationship between property rights and eco-
nomic development. Most social scientists—from classical polit-
ical economists to contemporary legal scholars and new institu-
tional economists—argue that secure property rights are a nec-
essary prerequisite for economic development.57 However, im-
plicit and unstated in most of these theories is that it funda-
mentally matters whose property rights are secure. From a neo-
classical and new institutional “micro” perspective, only secure 
property rights for those with skills, knowledge, and capital 
lead to economic growth. From a political economy and new in-
stitutional “macro” viewpoint, only secure property rights for 
those who will use their political voice to agitate for growth en-
hancing economic policies are related to long-run development. 
At a micro level, secure property rights are thought to gener-
ate economic growth for three reasons. First, secure property 
rights internalize externalities, thereby incentivizing efficient 
levels of investment and ensuring that a resource is neither 
over- nor under-utilized.58 Second, clear allocation and en-
forcement of resource entitlements can generate efficiency 
gains by reducing transaction costs in exchanges between par-
ties and allowing reallocation to more efficient users.59 Third, 
secure private property rights may facilitate access to credit 
and the conversion of dead assets into investment capital be-
cause the underlying asset can serve as collateral, making re-
                                                                                                                                     
 57. See VON HAYEK, supra note 2, at 112–16; MARX, CAPITAL, supra note 2, 
at 59–69; INSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 33–35, 51–52, 110, 121; WILLIAMSON, 
supra note 2, at 26–29; Colonial Origins, supra note 2, at 1369, 1373; Alston, 
Libecap, & Schneider, supra note 2, at 58, 59; Besley & Ghatak, supra note 2, 
at 5, 10, 26; North & Weingast, supra note 2; Posner, supra note 2, at 3–5; 
ROUSSEAU, supra note 2, at 55–84; SMITH, supra note 2; Rodrik, Subramani-
an, & Trebbi supra note 7, at 132. 
 58. See Demsetz, supra note 2, at 348; Besley, supra note 2, at 905–07, 
916; Field, supra note 2, at 286–89; Goldstein & Udry, supra note 2, at 981–
84. 
 59. See Coase, supra note 2, at 19; Besley & Ghatak, supra note 2, at 17–
18. 
168 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 38:1 
payment commitments more enforceable.60 Markets, credit ac-
cess, and efficient resource use drive economic growth by ena-
bling specialization and gains from trade, providing capital for 
reinvestment, and increasing productivity. 
At the core of these micro-theories of property rights and eco-
nomic development is an implicit assumption that what actual-
ly matters is property rights security for those with access to 
complementary production inputs, i.e., skills, knowledge, or 
capital. Appropriate know-how or access to capital is obviously 
implicit in the internalization of costs and benefits, which is 
the basis for secure private property rights. Efficient levels of 
investment and resource utilization can only occur when the 
owner has the necessary complementary production inputs.61 
Likewise, a growth-enhancing reallocation of resource entitle-
ments into the hands of more efficient users will not occur—
even and especially with secure private property rights—when 
the existence of multiple owners creates a hold-out problem,62 
or when owners place an idiosyncratic, non-economic value on a 
property.63 And when property rights are secure but non-
alienable, as is the case with forests, pastures, and fisheries 
held collectively according to indigenous customary tenure 
law,64 greater property rights security for customary resource 
holders will actually prevent reallocation through voluntary 
market exchange. Therefore, secure property rights for owners 
who lack the skills or capital to invest efficiently in a resource 
but who also will not or cannot bargain for some reason65 may 
actually prevent a more economically efficient allocation of re-
sources and impede growth. The credit access theory explicitly 
recognizes the relationship between property rights, access to 
capital, and growth; if the poor are credit constrained for exog-
                                                                                                                                     
 60. See DE SOTO, supra note 2, at 63–65; Eric Field & Maximo Torero, Do 
Property Titles Increase Credit Access Among the Urban Poor? Evidence from 
a Nationwide Titling Program 1, 24–25 (March 2006) (unpublished manu-
script), available at 
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/field/files/FieldTorerocs.pdf. 
 61. Besley & Ghatak, supra note 2, at 26–34. 
 62. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anti-Commons: Property in the 
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 674 (1998). 
 63. Margaret Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 986 
(1982). 
 64. BRUCE, supra note 40. 
 65. Id.; Heller, supra note 107, at 673–74; Radin, supra note 108, at 987; 
SENED, supra note 6, at 76. 
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enous reasons such as ethnic discrimination,66 or actually face 
savings rather than credit constraints,67 then making property 
rights more secure will not “unlock” hidden capital. 
At a macro level, a number of Western political theorists 
have argued that secure private property rights engender polit-
ical accountability, which in turn leads to economic policies 
that are broadly growth-enhancing, rather than narrowly bene-
ficial to only powerful, rent-seeking elites.68 According to this 
view, private property is an essential pillar in the protection of 
individual liberty. The individual economic security that pri-
vate property provides is thought to act as a safeguard against 
the potentially totalitarian power of the state, and individuals 
are much more likely to actively oppose government policies 
when they know their livelihoods are not at risk.69 The result-
ing political accountability to a broad cross-section of the popu-
lation encourages governments to implement economic policies 
that benefit society as a whole, such as investments in educa-
tion, roads, and other public goods.70 
Relatedly, some contend that the failure of political interest 
groups to implement the most effective growth promoting poli-
cies and then use political power to bargain over distribution 
results from a commitment problem, which stems from weak 
property rights.71 Since political power is in part a result of 
                                                                                                                                     
 66. John V. Duca & Stuart S. Rosenthal, Borrowing Constraints, House-
hold Debt, and Racial Discrimination in Loan Markets 15–16 (Fed. Reserve 
Bank of Dall., Research Paper No. 9312, 1993), available at 
http://dallasfed.org/assets/documents/research/papers/1993/wp9312.pdf. 
 67. Pascaline Dupas & Jonathan Robinson, Savings Constraints and Mi-
croenterprise Development: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Kenya 16 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14693, 2009), available 
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14693; Jonathan M. Morduch, The Micro-
finance Promise, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1569, 1609 (1999). 
 68. DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL (2012); see 
generally Colonial Origins, supra note 2; Institutions, supra note 13; Inequal-
ity, supra note 13. 
 69. VON HAYEK, supra note 2, at 115. 
 70. ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 71, at 456–57; Stanley L. 
Engerman & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Colonialism, Inequality, and Long-Run 
Paths of Development 15–17 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 11057, 2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11057.pdf; Ine-
quality, supra note 21, at 75–76; Institutions, supra note 21. 
 71. See generally Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 
Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth, in 1A HANDBOOK 
OF ECONOMIC GROWTH VOLUME 385, 387 (Philippe Aghion & Steven N. 
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economic power, political groups who benefit relatively less 
from growth enhancing economic policies and foresee that their 
relative economic position will decline and thus their relative 
political strength as well, will resist pie-maximizing economic 
policies that hurt their relative economic positions—in fear 
that newly ascendant political-economic elites will change the 
rules of the game.72 Strong protections against government ex-
propriation theoretically allow the commitment problem to be 
overcome by ensuring that those who gain in relative economic 
strength will not use their new political power to seize the as-
sets of those who gain less from pie-maximizing growth poli-
cies. Other researchers and theorists strongly disagree, con-
tending that private property reinforces, rather than con-
strains, the power of elites, because it is precisely the institu-
tion of private property that puts the owners of capital inputs 
in an advantaged bargaining position vis-à-vis labor. In this 
view, private property relations facilitate the increasing con-
centration of economic capital and corresponding political pow-
er, rather than serving as a check on government authority.73 
A far more nuanced understanding of the role played by se-
cure property rights in generating government accountability 
and constraining the power of elites is required. Elites are not 
a single monolithic group—different groups of elites have dif-
ferent interests and compete amongst themselves for power.74 
Security of property rights for elites can therefore increase ac-
countability of the governing elites towards other elites with 
divergent interests,75 incentivizing the adoption of broadly ben-
eficial economic policies. Likewise, accountability of public offi-
cials to the majority, facilitated by broad but not universal 
property rights security, may incentivize growth-enhancing 
                                                                                                                                     
Durlauf eds., 2005); see also Daron Acemoglu, Why Not a Political Coase The-
orem? Social Conflict, Commitment, and Politics, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 620, 620 
(2003), available at http://economics.mit.edu/files/4461. 
 72. Id. at 621, 623. 
 73. See VIVEK CHIBBER, LOCKED IN PLACE 59–61 (2003); Douglas Hay, Prop-
erty, Authority and the Criminal Law, in ALBION’S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND 
SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 17, 18–19 (Douglas Hay et al. eds., 
1975); MARX, CAPITAL supra note 2; Marx, supra note 33. 
 74. YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF 
PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN 
AMERICAN STATES 22–23, 25–26 (2002). 
 75. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: 
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 82, 196 (1962). 
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economic policies that benefit the majority even while hurting 
some groups. Seen in this light, secure property rights for mar-
ginalized minorities are not required for the kind of govern-
ment accountability that leads to aggregate, growth-enhancing 
economic policies. Once again, whose property rights are secure 
matters. 
B. Empirical Econometric Findings 
This section empirically tests whether the political and eco-
nomic implications of secure property rights indeed do depend 
on whose property rights are secure, demonstrating that secu-
rity of property rights for marginalized minorities is irrelevant 
for long-run economic development. First, the core empirical 
strategy is explained. Second, the results and findings are pre-
sented and discussed. Third, two alternative econometric mod-
els are employed as a robustness check to confirm the validity 
of the results. 
A generalized least squares (“GLS”) model with bootstrapped 
standard errors is used to regress log per capita income on the 
indices of property rights from ICRG, Heritage Foundation, 
and the new measures of Property Insecurity. Results are re-
ported in Table 4. Bootstrapping entails estimating the sam-
pling distribution by sampling with replacement from the orig-
inal data, and allows hypothesis testing based on the empirical 
population distribution even when data is nonparametric and 
violates common assumptions regarding continuity or paramet-
ric families.76 The nonparametric approach of bootstrapped 
standard errors was adopted because the empirical distribution 
of the primary variable of interest—Property Insecurity—does 
not meet parametric assumptions, and there is no a priori the-
oretical reason to assume any particular asymptotic population 
distribution. Therefore, in order to accurately assess statistical 
significance, a technique that is applicable regardless of the 
form of the data’s probability density function had to be uti-
lized. The results in Table 4 are based on resampling with re-
placement 1000 times. 
The linear regressions are for the GLS equation: 
log yi = α + βPi + µXi + єi     (1) 
                                                                                                                                     
 76. BRADLEY EFRON & ROBERT J. TIBSHIRANI, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
BOOTSTRAP 5, 47 (1993). 
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where yi is GDP per capita in country i, Pi is the property rights 
measure, Xi is a vector of covariates, and єi is the random error 
term. The coefficient of interest is β, which measures the effect 
of property security and insecurity on per capita income. An 
alternative specification, where the outcome of interest is the 
composite Human Development Index (“HDI”) from the UNDP 
Human Development Reports Office, is also examined. The 
HDI is an average of life expectancy, literacy rates plus gross 
school enrollment, and log per capita income.77 
The Property Insecurity scores are the average from 1985 to 
2003, the most recent time period for which MAR data was 
available for group dispossession from land, forced internal re-
settlement, and internal resettlement by policy. The ICRG 
Property Rights index is the average for 1985 to 1995, the most 
recent time period available and the data widely used in previ-
ous studies.78 Heritage Foundation Property Rights scores are 
the average for the ten year period beginning in 1995, the first 
year for which data became available.79 All dependent variables 
are for 2005 to mitigate the possibility of reverse causality. Re-
gional dummies are based on classifications from the United 
Nations Development Programme (“UNDP”).80 This approach 
was adopted because “[t]he conventional choice for regional 
dummies—the World Bank’s regional classifications—is endog-
enous” as the World Bank “regions themselves are defined on 
the basis of per capita income.”81 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
 77. Human Development Index (HDI), HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORTS, 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2012). 
 78. See, e.g., Colonial Origins, supra note 2, at 1378; Geography and Insti-
tutions, supra note 7, at 1266; Boschini, Pettersson & Roine, supra note 63, at 
600; Djankov & Reynal-Querol, supra note 63; Knack & Keefer, supra, note 7, 
at 217; Mehlum, Moene & Torvik, supra note 63, at 13. 
 79. See 2012 Index of Economic Freedom, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, 
http://www.heritage.org/index/explore?view=by-region-country-year (last vis-
ited Nov. 18, 2012) (showing that there is no data pre-1995). 
 80. See United Nations Dev. Programme, 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2012) 
(The list of countries within each regional bureau is available after accessing 
the link of that bureau office.). 
 81. William Easterly, Inequality Does Cause Underdevelopment: Insights 
From a New Instrument, 84 J. DEV. ECON. 755, 765 (2007). 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Property Rights (ICRG),     
1985-1995
0.603*** 
(0.04)
0.446*** 
(0.07)
Property Rights (Heritage 
Foundation), 1995-2004
0.041*** 
(0)
0.031***  
(0)
Ln Property Insecurity 
Mean, 1985-2003
0.03   
(0.22)
-0.037    
(0.25)
Ln Property Insecurity 
Max, 1985-2003
0.01    
(0.01)
-0.074     
(-0.17)
Ln Property Insecurity 
Weighted, 1985-2003
-0.632   
(0.52)
-0.25     
(0.38)
Latin America and the 
Caribbean dummy
-1.717*   
(0.68)
-0.252    
(0.39)
-0.573    
(0.58)
-1.815**  
(0.62)
-1.802**   
(0.61)
-1.795*** 
(0.61)
Asia dummy -1.769*   
(0.71)
-0.252    
(0.39)
-0.54     
(0.57)
-1.934**  
(0.62)
-1.930**   
(0.62)
-1.917**  
(0.62)
Africa dummy -3.073*** 
(0.69)
-1.334**  
(0.44)
-1.567**  
(0.57)
-3.272*** 
(0.61)
-3.280***  
(0.61)
-3.202*** 
(0.6)
Europe dummy -0.754    
(0.68)
-0.132    
(0.32)
0.065     
(0.56)
-1.017    
(0.61)
-1.023     
(0.61)
-1.012    
(0.6)
Oceania dummy -2.134**  
(0.74)
-0.734    
(0.63)
-0.836    
(0.65)
-1.459    
(0.91)
-1.478     
(0.86)
-1.463    
(0.85)
R2 0.435 0.581 0.683 0.471 0.667 0 0.507 0 0.508 0.016 0.497
Number of observations 178 120 120 157 157 112 112 112 112 110 110
Property Rights (ICRG),     
1985-1995
0.079*** 
(0.01)
0.047***  
(0.01)
Property Rights (Heritage 
Foundation), 1995-2004
0.005***  
(0)
0.003***  
(0)
Property Insecurity Mean, 
1985-2003
0.012  
(0.03)
-0.017    
(0.02)
Property Insecurity Max, 
1985-2003
0.008   
(0.02)
-0.016     
(0.02)
Property Insecurity 
Weighted, 1985-2003
-0.088   
(0.07)
-0.041    
(0.04)
Latin America and the 
Caribbean dummy
-0.164*   
(0.07)
-0.011    
(0.07)
-0.054    
(0.07)
-0.168*   
(0.07)
-0.171**   
(0.06)
-0.172**  
(0.06)
Asia dummy -0.208**  
(0.07)
-0.051    
(0.07)
-0.079    
(0.07)
-0.211**  
(0.07)
-0.212**   
(0.07)
-0.211*** 
(0.06)
Africa dummy -0.426*** 
(0.07)
-0.247***  
(0.07)
-0.289*** 
(0.07)
-0.454*** 
(0.07)
-0.456***  
(0.06)
-0.448*** 
(0.06)
Europe dummy -0.069    
(0.07)
-0.007    
(0.06)
0.01      
(0.07)
-0.093    
(0.06)
-0.095     
(0.06)
-0.093    
(0.06)
Oceania dummy -0.209*   
(0.09)
-0.094    
(0.094)
-0.093    
(0.08)
-0.161    
(0.11)
-0.166     
(0.11)
-0.162    
(0.12)
R2 0.613 0.53 0.752 0.362 0.748 0.001 0.684 0.001 0.685 0.016 0.674
Number of observations 173 120 120 156 156 110 110 110 110 108 108
Table 4.  Large Sample: Cross-Sectional GLS Regressions of Long-Run Development                                  
Dependent Variable:  Log per capita GDP, 2005
Dependent Variable:  HDI Score, 2005
Notes: Dependent variables are log GDP per capita (PPP) and the Human Development Index score; Property Rights (ICRG)is the 0 to 10 scaled version 
from IRIS where a higher score means more protection against expropriation; Property Insecurity Weighted is the sum of minority group insecurity 
weighted by the group’s proportion of the population; Property Insecurity Max is the property insecurity score for the worst-off group in a country; 
Property Insecurity Mean is the unweighted average of group property insecurity scores; higher property insecurity scores indicate higher levels of 
property insecurity (the inverse of the property rights indicator); the omitted continent dummy is for North America; all property insecurity scores are 
logged to base e.  Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%,, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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The large sample of cross-country GLS regression results 
displayed in Table 4 indicates that there is no relationship be-
tween the property insecurity of marginalized minority groups 
and either GDP per capita or HDI. The findings here also reaf-
firm robust previous findings from other studies of a strong 
correlation between long-run development and security of 
property rights for foreign investors and domestic elites. Coun-
tries in which marginalized segments of the population suffer 
from severe property insecurity often have relatively high lev-
els of per capita income and high achievement in terms of hu-
man development outcomes, reflecting steady economic growth 
rates since 1500 C.E. In other words, countries where margin-
alized groups experience significant property insecurity—as 
measured by the risk of forced displacement and resettle-
ment—often still experience high growth. The property insecu-
rity of marginalized minorities does not undermine economic 
development as measured by either per capita income or HDI. 
However, property rights security for elites and foreign inves-
tors—and other segments of the population whose experience 
with legal enforcement is adequately captured by the ICRG 
and Heritage Foundation indices—does improve long-run 
growth. In the relationship between property rights and long-
run economic development, it fundamentally matters whose 
property rights are secure. Based on the new bottom-up meas-
ure of Property Insecurity presented here, this Article finds that 
although secure property rights for elites and foreign investors 
are positively correlated with long-run economic development, 
property rights for marginalized groups are not. Aggregate 
long-run growth is not affected by property insecurity for mar-
ginalized minorities. 
From an econometric standpoint, the failure to find a signifi-
cant statistical relationship between Property Insecurity and 
the dependent variables GDP per capita, and also between 
Property Insecurity and HDI means that the standard for re-
jecting the null hypothesis—that there is no relationship be-
tween property insecurity and economic development—was not 
met. Therefore, to avoid erroneous reliance on a “false nega-
tive,” we must assess the likelihood of a Type II error. A Type 
II error occurs when the null hypothesis is not correct, but a 
statistical test fails to reject it regardless. The probability of a 
Type II error under the various model specifications and as-
sumptions employed here can be evaluated according to given 
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hypothesized effect size, number of variables, and sample size. 
As detailed in Appendix 1, for all the empirical specifications 
presented in this Article, the likelihood of a Type II error is less 
than 5–10% (depending on parameter assumptions).82 There-
fore, the finding of no relationship between property insecurity 
and long-run growth is reliably robust. 
However, as an additional robustness check on these empiri-
cal findings, this analysis utilizes the limited sample83 and re-
produces the ordinary least squares specification presented by 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (“AJR”)84 in their well-
known paper, which argues that institutional quality, specifi-
cally property rights security, is a fundamental determinant of 
economic development.85 Findings can be directly compared by 
examining the impact of Property Insecurity within the same 
universe of observations and using the same regression strate-
gy. For the AJR specification, the Property Insecurity Index co-
vers the period 1985 to 1995—the same time frame as the 
ICRG Property Rights measure initially used by AJR—and the 
continent dummies, latitude control, and year for the per capita 
GDP dependent variable are also the same as those used by 
AJR. 86 Results in Table 5 once again indicate that there is no 
relationship between property insecurity of marginalized mi-
norities and long-run economic development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
 82. The likelihood of a Type II error is less than 10% in models with a 
small hypothesized effect (0.05), while for a slightly larger hypothesized effect 
(0.1), the likelihood falls to 5% or less. 
 83. The AJR base sample is limited to sixty-four ex-colonies for which data 
is available on settler mortality. Colonial Origins, supra note 2, at 1377. 
 84. Id. at 1378; Geography and Institutions, supra note 7, at 1252, 1253. 
 85. Colonial Origins, supra note 2. 
 86. Colonial Origins, supra note 2, at 1378–80; Geography and Institu-
tions, supra note 7, at 1248–49. 
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The AJR87 article is well-known not for its finding of a simple 
correlation between expropriation risk and per capita income, 
as such a correlation could be explained by reverse causality 
and omitted variables, but for its creative use of settler mortal-
ity as an instrumental variable to predict institutional quality 
in an attempt to avoid endogeneity problems.88 Arguing that 
low settler mortality rates and sparse pre-colonial populations 
encouraged settlers to replicate European institutions with 
strong private property rights and checks against government 
power—while colonial disease environments and factor en-
dowments favoring the establishment of extractive industries 
generated higher degrees of inequality, less accountable politi-
cal institutions, and ultimately less secure property rights for 
the majority of the population—AJR89 found a strong and sig-
nificant relationship between settler mortality and the ICRG 
Property Rights indicator.90 
As another additional robustness check on the new empirical 
findings presented here, this Article also re-estimates AJR’s 
instrumental variable model, substituting Property Insecurity 
as the property rights measure. Again, the results confirm our 
findings. For almost all specifications, the first-stage relation-
ship between settler mortality and property rights disappears 
when any measure of Property Insecurity is used, and in the 
models where the relationship is statistically significant, the 
sign is the opposite of what the expectation would be if low set-
                                                                                                                                     
 87. Colonial Origins, supra note 2. 
 88. See id. at 1373. For critiques of this instrumental variable strategy, see 
generally David Albouy, The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: 
An Investigation of Settler Mortality Data (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 14130, 2008), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14130.pdf (disputing the validity of the settler 
mortality data); John McArthur & Jeffrey Sachs, Institutions and Geography: 
Comment on Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2000) 10 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8114, 2001), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8114.pdf (arguing that settler mortality fails to 
meet the exclusion restriction because disease environment impacts devel-
opment directly); Edward L. Glaeser et al., Do Institutions Cause Growth? 26 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10568, 2004), available 
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10568.pdf (contending that education and 
culture drive development rather than institutions and the density of Euro-
pean settlement is correlated with these factors). 
 89. Colonial Origins, supra note 2, at 1370–71. 
 90. See generally Colonial Origins, supra note 2. 
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tler mortality rates indeed facilitated the widespread enjoy-
ment of property rights. Results are shown in Appendix 2 (Ta-
ble 6, Panels C–E). Stated succinctly, there is no relationship 
between Property Insecurity and settler mortality. This finding 
reaffirms our previous findings that the indices commonly used 
to measure property rights security do not reflect the property 
rights enjoyed or not enjoyed by marginalized groups: if they 
did, then settler mortality would also predict Property Insecuri-
ty (with the opposite sign). This finding also calls into question 
the validity of settler mortality as an instrumental variable for 
secure property rights, as utilized by AJR, since theoretically if 
settler mortality is operating through the mechanism AJR pos-
its, then it should also predict Property Insecurity. 
Taken together, these empirical results confirm that the rela-
tionship between property rights and economic development 
depends on whose property rights are secure, and that the se-
curity of property rights for marginalized minorities is irrele-
vant for long-run economic growth. Growth can occur when the 
property rights of elites and foreign investors are secure but 
vulnerable minorities face a high risk of expropriation. 
This can be understood given the dual theoretical framework 
discussed above in Part II.A, which identifies both the micro 
and macro mechanisms through which secure property rights 
facilitate economic development. From a micro perspective, 
long-run growth may be possible in a country despite property 
insecurity for marginalized groups because resources are being 
reallocated into the hands of investors with better access to 
complementary production inputs. From a macro perspective, if 
one pathway through which secure private property rights 
leads to economic growth is by increasing government account-
ability, then the findings presented here indicate that a more 
nuanced understanding of the role played by private property 
rights in constraining the power of elites is required. Since the 
ICRG index measures the security of property of elites and 
large investors, while the Property Insecurity Index is sensitive 
to the risk of expropriation faced by less powerful ethnocultural 
minorities, one might predict that Property Insecurity would be 
a more appropriate proxy for constraints on elites than the 
ICRG measure. However, the absence of a relationship between 
Property Insecurity and long-run economic growth indicates 
that secure property rights for ethnocultural minorities are not 
2012] PROPERTY INSECURITY 179 
necessary for the kind of government accountability that incen-
tivizes the adoption of growth-enhancing economic policies. 
C. Historical and Contemporary Case Studies 
Heterogeneity in property rights security, as well as the com-
plex relationship between secure property rights and economic 
development, is also evident historically. The enclosure of the 
commons in seventeenth century Britain—broadly acknowl-
edged to have reduced overgrazing and increased agricultural 
investments on newly enclosed land—improved the property 
rights security of landed elites but eroded the property rights of 
small and medium cottagers who previously had rights to the 
newly enclosed commons.91 Increasing the security of private 
property rights for the gentry required expropriating the prop-
erty of small-hold farmers and pastoralists. The criminal law of 
eighteenth century Britain operated explicitly to strengthen 
the property rights claims of landed elites and to erode custom-
ary use rights traditionally enjoyed by yeomen. The Black Act 
of 1723 created fifty new capital offenses punishable by hang-
ing, directed at “crimes” that had previously been understood 
as customary use, such as deer stealing, breaking the heads of 
fishponds, and cutting down young trees.92 The complex web of 
usufruct rights in the forest—in which the rights to harvest 
trees and berries, hunt deer, and clear land for agriculture 
were shared among many parties and determined by season 
and status93—was crystallized into clear-cut freehold titles that 
vested in the landed gentry.94 By redefining crimes as an of-
fense against property, rather than against another person, the 
Black Act allowed law to cloak itself in impartiality—masking 
the power relations underlying the allocation and enforcement 
of property rights entitlements.95 Here, greater property rights 
                                                                                                                                     
 91. See YELLING, supra note 3, 46–70. 
 92. E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGINS OF THE BLACK ACT 
270–77 (1975). 
 93. For the canonical description of the progression of Western law from 
status to contract, see HENRY JAMES SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS 
CONNECTION TO THE HISTORY OF EARLY SOCIETY 319 (10th ed. 1861) (“Not 
many of us are so unobservant as not to perceive that in innumerable cases 
where old law fixed a man’s social position irreversibly at his birth, modern 
law allows him to create it for himself by convention . . . .”). 
 94. THOMPSON, supra note 97, at 270–77. 
 95. Id. 
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security for some actors entailed greater property insecurity for 
others. 
Likewise, the dispossession of Native Americans from their 
land was a necessary prerequisite for the expansion of large 
plantations and the widespread establishment of small freehold 
farms for white settlers throughout the United States in the 
first two centuries of the nation’s history. Approximately 
100,000 Native Americans had their eastern homelands seized 
during the nineteenth century.96 The Cherokee, Chickasaw, 
Choctaw, Creek, and Seminole suffered wholesale legal expro-
priation and were forcibly removed to marginal land by the In-
dian Removal Act of 1830.97 Congress passed the Indian Re-
moval Act in 1830; by 1840, over 50,000 Native Americans had 
been forcibly relocated from the American Southwest, opening 
twenty-five million acres for settlement.98 Later, fourteen thou-
sand Cherokee men, women, and children were marched over-
land, at gunpoint, by the U.S. Army in the summer of 1938. 
Four thousand died from inclement weather, mistreatment by 
soldiers, inadequate food, and disease.99 The widely lauded se-
cure private property rights enjoyed by yeoman American 
farmers in the nineteenth century100 were made possible by the 
property insecurity of Native Americans. 
Brazil is a contemporary example of a dynamic, rapidly grow-
ing upper middle income country with a high level of property 
insecurity for marginalized groups. But Brazil also has strong 
property rights protections for a broad cross-section of citizens, 
particularly elites and foreign investors. Brazil’s GDP per capi-
ta in 2005 was $8,505 and its growth rate reached 7.5% in 
2010.101 Its most recent ICRG Property Rights Security score 
                                                                                                                                     
 96. Russell Thornton, Cherokee Population Losses during the Trail of 
Tears: A New Perspective and a New Estimate, 31 ETHNOHISTORY 289, 289 
(1984). 
 97. Indian Removal Act of 1830, 25 U.S.C. 1988 § 174 (1830). 
 98. Thornton, supra note 101, at 289; Leonard A. Carlson & Mark A. Rob-
erts, Indian Lands, “Squatterism,” and Slavery: Economic Interests and the 
Passage of the Indian Removal Act of 1830, 43 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 486 
(2006). 
 99. Thornton, supra note 101, at 291–92, 297. 
 100. Institutions, supra note 21; Inequality, supra note 21, at 52–53, 59–60. 
 101. International Human Development Indicators, United Nations Devel-
opment Programme, 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/display_cf_xls_indicator.cfm?indicator_
id=20206&lang=en (last visited Nov. 19, 2012). 
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was in the top half globally at 7.9—higher than the world mean 
of 7.06—while its Property Insecurity scores for the same period 
were also both in the upper fiftieth percentile. Brazil currently 
gathers approximately 90% of its energy from hydroelectric 
power—a production structure that requires the construction 
and operation of hydroelectric dams for continued growth.102 
Since 1985, 50,000 indigenous and local residents have been 
displaced and resettled due to dam construction, with a majori-
ty of resettled households left worse-off than they had been pri-
or to dam construction.103 In 2010, the Brazilian government 
approved construction of the world’s third largest hydroelectric 
power plant on the Xingu River, a large tributary of the Ama-
zon. Projected to generate 11,000 megawatts, the Belo Monte 
dam will provide power for Brazil’s fast-growing economy while 
displacing approximately 20,000–40,000 indigenous Amazonian 
Indians.104 
CONCLUSION 
The history of economic development on every continent is 
rife with examples of the role played by power in determining 
whose property rights are made secure and insecure under de 
facto legal institutions, and the considerable heterogeneity of 
property rights security enjoyed by different groups in the 
same country. Economic growth has often involved the expro-
priation of property from marginalized groups and the realloca-
tion of these valuable resources into the hands of more politi-
cally powerful constituencies with access to the knowledge and 
capital necessary for efficient use and investment. 
Property rights are complex in both legal content and politi-
cal and economic meaning; they are not a traffic light along a 
one-dimensional continuum of “strong” to “weak.” The hetero-
geneity of property rights enjoyment—widely recognized by 
contemporary legal scholars working in the domestic context—
has been inadequately considered in recent cross-country in-
ternational and comparative property rights research. Property 
rights have instead often been conceptualized in a formal ra-
ther than a realist framework, based on the implicit assump-
                                                                                                                                     
 102. PBS, supra note 3. 
 103. THAYER SCUDDER, THE FUTURE OF LARGE DAMS: DEALING WITH SOCIAL, 
ENVIRONMENTAL, INSTITUTIONAL, AND POLITICAL COSTS 58–62 (2005). 
 104. PBS, supra note 3. 
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tion that rights enjoyment is uniform across a society. The 
cross-national indices of property rights widely used in the 
cross-country research literature—initially designed to assess 
the risk of expropriation faced by international businesses—fail 
to adequately account for the institutional framework encoun-
tered by marginalized minority groups. In fact, as this Article 
shows, members of marginalized groups often face significantly 
higher property insecurity than foreign investors and domestic 
elites. In many countries, strongly secure property rights for 
some coexist alongside insecure property rights for others. 
Understanding the role played by property rights in economic 
development requires nuanced attention to this complex heter-
ogeneity in property rights enjoyment. Although it has been 
widely argued that secure private property rights are a prereq-
uisite for economic development, it actually matters whose 
property rights are secure. When heterogeneity in property 
rights enjoyment is considered, the findings presented here 
demonstrate that property insecurity of marginalized minori-
ties does not necessarily reduce long-run economic develop-
ment. 
These findings are thought-provoking as they challenge wide-
ly held assumptions regarding the relationship between prop-
erty rights and economic development. At a micro level, growth 
can occur when property rights are broadly secure but margin-
alized minorities face a high risk of expropriation, because re-
sources may be reallocated into the hands of investors with ac-
cess to knowledge, capital, and other complementary produc-
tion inputs. And at a macro-level, secure property rights for 
marginalized minorities are not required to incentivize gov-
ernments to adopt broadly growth-enhancing economic policies, 
as security of property rights for elites can increase accounta-
bility of governing elites towards other elites with divergent 
interests, while broad but not universal property rights securi-
ty can generate accountability of public officials to the majority. 
The practical implications of these findings push in two direc-
tions. On the one hand, if aggregate economic growth is the ob-
jective, then policymakers may wish to ignore (or encourage) 
the expropriation of land and resources from marginalized 
groups, and the reallocation of these resources into the hands 
of more productive investors. On the other hand, if broadly in-
clusive economic development that reduces poverty and socio-
economic exclusion is the central policy objective, then atten-
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tion must be paid to distributional consequences—meaning 
that summary country-level measures such as growth, income 
per capita, and HDI are incomplete and sometimes inappropri-
ate indicators. 
The relationship between distributional issues and poverty 
reduction has generally been examined with reference to “ver-
tical” income inequality, which represents the distribution of 
income among households and individuals. The links between 
growth, inequality, and poverty reduction have been extensive-
ly explored over the past two decades.105 As a result of this re-
search, there is a broad consensus on two stylized facts.106 
First, aggregate economic growth is critically important for 
poverty reduction. Historically, countries that have experienced 
the longest and most consistent periods of economic growth 
have likewise seen the greatest reduction in poverty; and richer 
countries generally have substantially lower poverty rates than 
do poor countries. Second, all other factors held constant, lower 
initial levels of inequality and more progressive changes in in-
come distributions promote poverty reduction. In two countries 
that experience the same growth rates, the country that began 
with a more equal distribution of income will see a greater re-
duction in poverty, and poverty will fall faster in countries 
where the rate of growth for the poor is faster than the rate of 
growth for the non-poor.107 Stated succinctly, changes in pov-
erty can be related to changes in mean income, and changes in 
relative incomes. 
The challenge from a policy perspective arises if there are 
trade-offs between pro-growth and pro-redistributive polices. 
When should a government pursue a set of policies that would 
promote high growth rates, but at the cost of increasing ine-
quality or eroding the incomes of some of the poor while raising 
the incomes of others? When might a government want to pur-
sue pro-redistributive policies that hurt aggregate growth? An-
swering these questions requires a clear normative framework 
regarding policy objectives: is the goal a reduction in the pov-
                                                                                                                                     
 105. See J. Humberto López, Chapter 4: The Relative Roles of Growth and 
Inequality for Poverty Reduction, in POVERTY REDUCTION AND GROWTH: 
VIRTUOUS AND VICIOUS CIRCLES 57 (Guillermo E. Perry et al. eds., 2006). 
 106. Id. at 70–71. 
 107. See generally, id. 
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erty headcount,108 a reduction in the severity of poverty for the 
poorest, higher incomes for the majority, or improvement in 
some other measure of well-being, and over what time horizon? 
Answering this question also requires contextually specific da-
ta and empirical analysis that would allow reliable predictions 
regarding the growth elasticity of poverty109 and likely distri-
butional and growth effects of a given basket of policies. 
This line of research on inequality, growth, and poverty pro-
vides an analogous framework to the challenge presented here 
by a similarly complex dynamic between property rights securi-
ty for marginalized groups, property rights security for more 
politically powerful constituencies, and economic growth. Given 
the possibility of trade-offs between property rights security for 
marginalized groups and aggregate economic growth, when 
would a government prioritize one over the other? Again, an-
swering this question requires a clear normative framework. 
Are secure property rights an end-in-themselves, regardless of 
any effects on economic outcomes, as a rights-based framework 
would suggest?110 Or are secure property rights justified and 
justifiable only on social welfare grounds?111 If the latter, what 
are the objectives the government is seeking to maximize (re-
ducing the absolute number of poor, reducing the severity of 
poverty for the poorest, improving social and economic inclu-
sion of marginalized groups, raising the incomes of the majori-
ty, increasing aggregate economic growth, etc.)? And, in a given 
country context, what is the empirically projected relationship 
between policies and these outcomes? 
One implication is clear, however: aggregate economic growth 
does not necessarily mean inclusive economic development. 
Those with the least power and voice may be left out and left 
behind by growth-enhancing policies that strengthen the prop-
erty rights of those with access to capital and political influence 
by weakening the property rights of marginalized groups. This 
                                                                                                                                     
 108. The number of people below a given poverty line, defined as $1.25 or $2 
a day. 
 109. The growth elasticity of poverty is the percentage reduction in poverty 
rates associated with a percentage change in per capita income. 
 110. See generally JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Las-
lett ed., Cambridge University Press 1988) (1690); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, 
STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). 
 111. See generally Demsetz, supra note 2; Coase, supra note 2; see also DE 
SOTO, supra note 2, at 224. 
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suggests that a narrow focus on aggregate economic growth—
without specific attention also to political and economic inclu-
sion and the equitable application of the law—can exacerbate 
poverty and socioeconomic exclusion and hurt the most vulner-
able. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Probability of Type II Error 
A Type II error occurs when a null hypothesis is false but a 
statistical test incorrectly fails to reject it. The probability of a 
Type II error is symbolized by β. β depends on the hypothesized 
effect size (E), the number of observations (N), the number of 
variables in the full model (V), the number of test variables (T), 
and the α-level chosen as the cut-off of statistical significance. 
Hypothesized effect size (E) is derived by comparing the hy-
pothesized R2 of the model including the Property Insecurity 
indicator with the R2 of the model including only the control 
variables. 
E = R2f - R2r      (2) 
P(Type II Error) = β     (3) 
β (E, N, V, T, α)      (4) 
Figure 3 illustrates the very small likelihood of a Type II er-
ror in our regression models. The figure shows the cut-off num-
ber of observations required for Type II error likelihoods of less 
than or equal to 5% (β = .05) and 10% (β = .1), for hypothesized 
effects of 0.05 and 0.10, across the ranges of R2 values encoun-
tered in the large sample GLS regressions shown in Table 4, at 
a significance level of α = 0.10, given our model with six varia-
bles. Because lower values of α increase the likelihood that an 
econometric model will fail to reject a null hypothesis even if 
false, a 10% significance level is used—the highest α-value 
commonly used in the literature. Since the smaller the hypoth-
esized effect, the larger the number of observations required to 
reduce the likelihood of a false negative, small hypothesized 
effects are used. 
For a hypothesized effect of E = R2f - R2r = 0.1, β is less than 
.05 (β < .05 ) at all relevant R2 values. For a hypothesized effect 
of E = R2f - R2r = 0.05, β is less than .05 (β < .05 ) at all but the 
lowest bounds of the R2 range. In other words, for all models 
the likelihood of a Type II error is less than 10% at even a 
small hypothesized effect, while the likelihood falls to 5% or 
less for a slightly larger hypothesized effect. 
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Appendix 2: Instrumental Variable Approach 
The two-staged least squares estimates used by Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson (“AJR”) treat property rights security, 
Pi, as endogenous, and are modeled as 
1st Stage:   Pi = α + βlogMi + µXi + єi  (5) 
2nd Stage:   log yi = α + βPi + µXi + єi  (6) 
where M is the settler mortality rate and Xi is a vector of co-
variates.112 
AJR argue that settler mortality rates affect institutions only 
through the structure of production, where high settler mortal-
ity rates favored the establishment of extensive extraction 
economies that relied on concentrated capital and the employ-
ment of low-skilled workers—ultimately producing property 
rights institutions that favored elites—while low settler mor-
tality led to broadly egalitarian land distribution and small 
scale self-employment, which ultimately engendered the wide-
spread enjoyment of secure property rights.113 The theoretical 
relationship underlying this instrumental variable strategy 
suggests that if property security and property insecurity are 
simply two sides of the same coin, settler mortality rates 
should also predict the Property Insecurity of ethnocultural mi-
norities. 
However, as shown in Table 6 (Panels C–E), the first-stage 
relationship between settler mortality and property rights dis-
appears when we substitute in any measure of Property Insecu-
rity. There is no statistically significant relationship for virtual-
ly any of the specifications, and for the two that show statisti-
cal significance of the relationship, the significance is de mini-
mis and the sign is the opposite of what we would expect if low 
settler mortality rates indeed facilitated the widespread en-
joyment of property rights. Stated succinctly, there is no rela-
tionship between Property Insecurity and settler mortality. 
This finding has three implications. First, it means that the 
second stage relationship (Table 6, Panel A)—for Property Inse-
curity and log per capita GDP—is not valid, because the settler 
mortality instrumental variable is not valid. Second, this find-
                                                                                                                                     
 112. See generally Colonial Origins, supra note 2; Geography and Institu-
tions, supra note 7. 
 113. Id. 
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ing reaffirms our previous findings that the commonly used in-
dices of the strength of property rights security do not reflect 
the property rights enjoyed or not enjoyed by marginalized 
groups; if they did, then settler mortality would also predict 
Property Insecurity (with the opposite sign). Third, this finding 
calls into question the validity of settler mortality as an IV for 
secure property rights, as utilized by AJR, since theoretically, if 
settler mortality is operating through the mechanism AJR pos-
its then it should also predict Property Insecurity. 
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